The DC Court of Appeals in Mazza v. Hollis, analyzed and addressed implications of a divorce settlement agreement with a child support clause merged but not incorporated into the final decree of divorce.
Factually, Mazza and Hollis were divorced in Georgia via a settlement agreement. Thereafter, Hollis moved to Washington, D.C. with the child and registered the divorce decree in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. Mazza later filed a Motion to Modify Custody and Child Support seeking a reduction in the amount of his monthly support obligation because of a substantial and material change in circumstances.
The trial judge denied child support moderation request reasoning that according to Cooper ruling the court has limited authority to modify child support as the agreement was merged but not incorporated the final decree.
Under Cooper ruling, a child support provision of a separation agreement that has been incorporated, but not merged, into an order of divorce gives the trial court only “limited authority” to modify the agreed child support.
Procedurally, D.C. Code § 46-204(a) in pertinent parts provides that any: order requiring payment of an amount of child support … may be modified upon a showing that there has been a substantial and material change in the needs of the child or the ability of the responsible relative to pay since the day on which the order was issued.
D.C. Code § 16-916.01(a) also provides in pertinent part that in any party seeking to modify an existing support order, if the judicial officer finds that there is an existing duty of child support, the judicial officer shall conduct a hearing on child support, make a finding, and enter a judgment in accordance with the child support guideline.
The Court of Appeals however disagreed for number of reasons. Under the Georgia law the existing child support agreement was effectively adopted by the divorce court as its own determination of the proper disposition of child support. In another word, the order was both merged and incorporated and thus the trial court has the authority to apply the DC Child Support Statute and guidelines to modify the order.
That is, Georgia, does not recognize the distinction between merger and incorporation embodied in the Cooper limitation; at least where child support is concerned, an agreement accepted by the divorce court may be modified in accordance with the support guidelines contained in Georgia law.
Generally, if the parties’ agreement has been adopted by the court as its own determination of the proper disposition — the principles embodied in the Child Support Guideline apply and the court has the authority to modify or change support.
Moreover, as the Georgia decree was also registered in DC Superior Court, the trial court had both the Statutory authority as well as the proper venue to modify the child support and according to the Guidelines.
As a matter of public policy also, rarely courts shy away from implementing or modifying child support. Even in cases where a settlement agreement is not incorporated in a final decree of the court, child support may be modified as the best interests of the children criteria always overrides written exclusionary agreements.
Refer to our Washington DC Divorce and child Support pages for more information on this topic